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The District Court incorrectly perceived that it had discretion to reimburse the Defendant 
School District as discretionary costs what was, in fact, the consideration paid by the District for 
its contract with the Mountain Home School District. The District Court's error was 
compounded by incorrect statements of fact (as the District now admits) contained in its 
memorandum of costs and affidavit in support. Regardless of the reason, the award of 
discretionary costs should be reversed. 
Plaintiff Terri Sanders is entitled to her fees on appeal because there is no reasonable 
basis in law for the School District's appeal. 
I. The District Court Exceeded its Power in Awarding the Defendant the Costs of 
Complying with the Contract It Voluntarily Entered. 
The costs of complying with a contract, voluntarily entered, are not costs of the action for 
a breach of that contract which should be awarded by a court. It is apparent from Defendant 
School District's brief, that the only item of cost awarded as "discretionary costs" was the price 
the District agreed to pay as part of its consideration for a bilateral agreement. 
The School District admits that District Court was incorrect when it concluded that "the 
School District paid total arbitration costs of $4,609.00." R., Vol. 1, p. 39. This was not the 
District Court's error alone, it was an error that arose because the School District (1) filed a 
memorandum of costs which stated that it sought "$2,304.50" in arbitration costs, which 
represented the total paid by the School District, not half of what was paid (as the District now 
claims), R., Vol. 1, p. 102, and (2) filed an affidavit of counsel which the District claimed 
supported its claim that it should recover as "one half' of its arbitration costs an amount that 
actually represented all of its arbitration costs, R. Vol. 1, p. 63. The District Court's ruling was 
actually largely correct on the facts, except as to those items on which the record presented by 
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the School District was misleading, and except in concluding that it had discretion to reimburse 
the School District for the cost of complying with its contract. 
The District Court correctly held that it should enforce a contract regarding how costs 
will be paid, if one exists l . R., Vol. 1, p. 139. The District Court correctly held that "In this 
case, the contract provided that the parties would split arbitration costs." Id. The District Court 
erred, however, when it held that "the School District paid total arbitration costs of $4,609.00." 
Id. An error the School District now admits. Appellant's Reply and Response, p. 23. The 
District also now seeks a remand to allow the District Court to correct this error, !d., but a 
remand would correct only the erroneous finding of fact. Reversal is required to correct the 
District Court's errors of law. 
The cost incurred by the School District, one half of the arbitrator's fee, is a portion of 
the consideration that the School District offered in its contract with the Mountain Home 
Education Association. R., Exhibits, 102 (pp. 15-16). The School District admits that 
participation in the arbitration process (including payment ofthat fee) was required if it was to 
comply with the contract it had entered, and that failure to participate would have been a breach 
of contract. Appellant's Reply and Response, p. 22. The School District thus urged the District 
Court and now this Court to award it as an item of discretionary costs the cost of consideration it 
paid for its contract. Idaho statutes only allow the District Court to award costs incurred in a 
civil action or proceeding, I.C. §12-101, it does not permit the courts to award costs incurred 
pursuant to a contract (except pursuant to an express claim for breach of that contract). The 
I Plaintiff Sanders sets aside, for the moment, the fact that the District never brought any counterclaim asserting that 
it had paid more than its share of the arbitration cost, or that the contract was in any way breached. However, the 
absence of such a counterclaim would also be fatal to any claim for an award of arbitration costs even if the District 
had paid all of those costs, rather than the one-half it was contractually obligated to pay. 
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District Court erred when it concluded that it had discretion to refund the District the cost of its 
contract. 
Furthennore, an award of discretionary costs is pennissible solely upon a finding that 
such costs were "exceptional." Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 
P.3d 161 (2005), overruled in part on other grounds by Farber v. State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 
307,208 P.3d 289 (2012); Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415,807 P.2d 633 (1991). The District 
Court found only that there was a contract requiring payment by each party of one-half of the 
arbitrator's fees. R. Vol. 1, p. 139. That does not amount to a finding that the costs were both 
necessary and exceptional, or that they were incurred in the course of a civil action. In the 
absence of such express findings, the District Court abused its discretion in awarding 
discretionary costs, and should be reversed. 
II. Principles of Judicial Deference to the Arbitration Process Compel Reversal of the 
District Court's Award of Arbitration Fees as Discretionary Costs of Action. 
This Court has repeatedly deferred to the expertise of arbitrators in deciding cases 
properly presented to them. In doing so, the Court has followed the lead provided by the u.s. 
Supreme Court. While the School District may be correct that, by its tenns, the Unifonn 
Arbitration Act does not apply to an employment-based dispute, the principles of deference 
applied to such arbitration agreements are similar if not even more deferential than those applied 
under the arbitration act. 
While the Unifonn Arbitration Act itself has limited applicability, and arguably excludes 
labor agreements from its scope, this Court has previously discussed that standards of review and 
the deference owed to arbitrators are matters of judicial policy that hold true whether a particular 
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dispute is a commercial one under the Uniform Arbitration Act or a labor dispute governed by 
common law principles: 
We recogmze that Western Construction is concerned with labor arbitration and as 
appellant points out and as is manifest in that decision, the scope of judicial review varies 
from that for commercial awards. We need merely add here that review in both areas is 
grounded upon similar considerations of judicial policy, and therefore Western 
Construction and other "labor" cases are persuasive though not exactly identical. See, e. 
g., Swift Industries, Inc. v. Botany Industries, Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1129-31 (3d Cir. 1972); 
Ludwig Honold Mamifacturing Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969). The 
"persuasiveness" is evidenced by the authority cited in both case law and in the parties' 
briefs herein. 
Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 101 Idaho 557, 562, n. 4, 617 P.2d 861 (1980). Because of 
these similarities, whether the dispute was a commercial one subject to the state Uniform 
Arbitration Act, a dispute of interstate commerce subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, or a 
labor dispute subject to either federal or state common law, this Court has cited to and relied 
upon the same federal authority favoring arbitration of disputes and a highly deferential standard 
of review that encourages finality. Hecla Min. Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 101 Idaho 557, 617 P.2d 
861 (1980); Loomis, Inc. v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 106,656 P.2d 1359 (1982). Each of these cases 
cited the standards first enunciated in the U.S. Supreme Court's "Steelworker Trilogy" of cases. 
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Entelprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 
593 (1960). 
The Steelworkers Trilogy stand generally for the proposition that an arbitrator's decision 
will not be disturbed by the courts so long as it "draws its essence from" the contract. Enterprise 
Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. This standard is just as, if not more deferential to the arbitrator's 
decision than the standards set out in the Uniform Arbitration Act. Thus, while the coverage of 
that Act may be in question the underlying standard, that the Court should defer to the 
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arbitrator's division of costs, particularly where it complies with the terms of the agreement to 
arbitrate, is beyond question. 
Allowing the School District to recover the one-half of the arbitrator's fees that it agreed 
to pay pursuant to contract, and that the arbitrator ordered it to pay, would allow a "back door" 
method of challenging an arbitrator's award that is not sanctioned by existing law. Such a 
challenge would open every arbitration decision to potential challenge via obscure procedural 
devices, and limit the positive effects of finality of arbitral awards. 
III. Plaintiff Terri Sanders Should Be Awarded Fees on Appeal Because Defendant 
School District's Position Was Without A Reasonable Basis in Law. 
The Defendant School District has ignored the clear authority provided by this Court in 
pursuing this appeal. Its arguments on appeal are only possible by ignoring numerous decisions 
of this Court. Where a legal position is directly contrary to the prior decisions of this Court it 
should be found to lack a reasonable basis, thus justifying an award of fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-
117. 
As discussed in detail in the opening briefs, the Court has repeatedly held that "I.C. § 12-
117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for the entities to which it applies." 
Potlatch Ed. Assn. v. Potlatch School District, 148 Idaho 630, 635, 226 P.3d 1277, 1282 (2010); 
Roe v. Harris, 128 Idaho 569,917 P.2d 403 (1996); Sate v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. 
("HWRO"), 130 Idaho 718, 724,947 P.2d 391,396 (1997)(I.C. 12-117 is exclusive basis of 
awarding fees against state agency); Westway Cosntr., Inc. v. Idaho Transportation Dept., 139 
Idaho 107,73 P.3d 721 (2003); Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 229 P.3d 21164 
(2012); Lake CDA Investments v. Idaho Dept. of Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 233 P.3d 721 (2010); 
Smith v. Washington County, 150 Idaho 388, 247 P.3d 615 (2010); Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. 
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County of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 258 P.3d 340 (2011); Sopatykv. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 
809,264 P.3d 916 (2011); Henry v. Taylor, Idaho 267 P.3d 1270 (January 5,2012); 
Keepler-Fleenor v. Fremont County, _ Idaho 268 P .3d 1159 (January 24, 2012); 
Arambarri v. Armstrong, Idaho _,274 P.3d 1249 (March 8, 2012); City of Osburn v. 
Randel, _ Idaho _,277 P.3d 353 (April 26, 2012); Idaho Transportation Dept. v. Grathol, 
_ Idaho _,278 P.3d 957 (June 1,2012). 
That Defendant's position is without basis is demonstrated by the incorrect statements it 
must make to try to justify that position. For instance, at page 6 of its brief in response, the 
School District admits that Plaintiff Sanders might have an issue on appeal "if there were a 
source oflaw stating that both I.C. §§12-120(3) and 12-117 could not both apply to a single 
case." Appellant's Reply and Response, p. 6. As noted above, this Court has repeatedly and for 
many years held that only one statute, I.C. §12-117 can apply in those cases to which it applies. 
This is the very meaning of the word "exclusive" in this setting. 
Similarly, the District claims that "Sanders cannot point to a single case that specifically 
state that I.e. § 12-117 is exclusive over I.e. § 12-120(3) when a school district or board is a party 
in a contract lawsuit." Appellant's Reply and Response, p. 9. Even more outrageously, the 
District claims that "none of those cases [decided by this Court] specifically holds that I.C. § 12-
117 is exclusive over I.C. § 12-120." Appellant's Reply and Response, p. 26. Yet, this is 
precisely the holding in Potlatch Ed. Assn., 148 Idaho 630, which holding was reaffirmed in 
Smith v. Washington County, 150 Idaho 388, 392. 
The School District's attempt to craft an argument that I.C. §12-117 is somehow not 
exclusive relies on simply pointing to cases where the issue of exclusivity was not raised by the 
parties. E.g., Sadid v. Idaho State Univ., 151 Idaho 932, 265 P.3d 1144 (2011); Noak v. Idaho 
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Dept. Correction, 152 Idaho 305,271 P.3d 703 (2012). In other words, the School District's 
argument relies solely and entirely upon the fact that in cases where the exclusivity of § 12-117 
was not raised by the parties, this Court did not find that § 12-117 was exclusive. But this Court 
has always held that it will not decide issues not raised by the parties, or consider issues raised 
but not supported by argument and authority. E.g., Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Van Tine, 132 
Idaho 902, 980 P.2d 566 (1999); Idaho Watersheds Project v. Bd. OJ Land Commissioners, 128 
Idaho 761, 918 P.2d 1206 (1996). The School District's attempt to build an argument on the 
basis of decisions that were not made on issues that were not presented to the Court does not 
present a reasonable basis for this appeal, and thus an award of Ms. Sanders' fees on appeal is 
appropriate pursuant to I. C. § 12-11 7. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of November, 2012 
James M. Piotrowski 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent Cross-Appellee 
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